This paper discusses a case study where we use relations to represent the requirements of a fault tolerant flight control system. This task is part of a larger research project, carried out on behalf of Dryden Flight Research Center, whose purpose is to investigate the certification of an adaptive flight control system that is fault tolerant with respect to sensor faults. We find that relations offer a versatile tool to formulate requirements, and that they provide a sound basis for building computer supported oracles for the certification phase.
Analytical Redundancy: A Basis for Fault Tolerance
Design and certification of complex, safe-critical systems call for a disciplined development process and rigorous tools in order to contain the consequences of component failures. The formal specification of the system requirements plays a crucial role within this process.
In this paper we present some results of a study aiming at the development of formal specification for an Analytical Redundancy based Fault Tolerant Flight Control System (AR-FTFCS). The sample aircraft we used for the study is the De Havilland DHC-2, a general aviation, single engine aircraft. Analytical Redundancy (AR) [5] is an alternative approach to physical redundancy to make provision for Fault Tolerance (FT). AR-FTFCS's exploit the correlation among sensors and the coupling among control surface actions to provide alternative means of controlling the aircraft. This study is part of a larger project, carried out for NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center, whose purpose is the certification of an adaptive fault tolerant flight control system. We adopt relational algebra to develop a formal specification of the AR-FTFCS functional requirements and design constraints. We use relations to specify definite aspects of the system requirements and to describe the behaviour of the system components. Then, we compose the individual requirements to form the entire specification. In this paper we focus only on those aspects of the specification that are related to the use of relational algebra as specification framework. We do not enter into the details of the requirements, nor we aim at developing a complete, consistent specification.
Relational Operations
Many of the operational requirements that we formulate rely on the concept that some component or aggregate of components must satisfy a minimal behavioral property. In relational terms, this is formulated by means of the refinement ordering. The refinement ordering between relations R and R is denoted by R R and defined by
L being the universal relation.
Many of the composition patterns that we use to build the specification from its components rely on two algebraic operators, which are the demonic composition and the demonic join. Demonic composition is denoted by R ✷ R , and defined by
Demonic join is denoted by R R and defined by
Further information about the refinement ordering, as well as the demonic operators introduced above, can be found in, e.g. [2, 4] . For the purposes of this paper, what we need to know about these concepts is summarized as follows:
• The demonic composition of relations R and R represents the specification that combines sequentially the requirements of R, then R .
• The demonic join of relations R and R represents the specification that combines simultaneously the requirements of R and R .
• Both the demonic composition and the demonic join are monotonic with respect to the refinement ordering, with respect to their two arguments.
While these operators are traditionally discussed in the context of homogeneous relations, we use them in this paper to compose heterogeneous relations; this imposes space compatibility requirements, which we briefly review below. For the purposes of this discussion, we introduce the concept of signature of a heterogeneous relation. In the context of our study, we are less interested in defining signatures than in making the reader aware of the concept of sig-nature, and of how it differs from other, similar, concepts. The signature of a heterogeneous relation from set X to set Y is the pair of sets (X, Y ); note that X is not necessarily the domain of R, nor is Y necessarily the range of R. X and Y are sets which we conveniently associate to R as sets whence arguments and images of R are drawn. The conditions we introduce below are not, strictly speaking, necessary conditions for the operations to be defined; rather, they are sufficient conditions which we impose (with some loss of generality) for the sake of simplicity.
• Refinement Ordering. In order for two heterogeneous relations R and R to be comparable by the refinement ordering, they must have the same signature.
• Demonic Composition. In order for two relations R and R to be composed sequentially, as in R ✷ R , the second term of the signature of R must be identical to the first term of relation R . For example, if the signature of R is ( X, Y ), then the signature of R must have the form (Y, Z) for some set Z.
• Demonic Join. In order for two heterogeneous relations R and R to be composed by the demonic join, they must have the same signature.
In the specification that we discuss in this paper, we often encounter cases where we must compose or compare relations that do not satisfy the signature compatibility requirements. We can alter the signature of a relation by multiplying it (left or right) by projection relations or their inverses. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss projection relations; we content ourselves with introducing an example of projection relation, and with illustrating how it can be used to meet the signature compatibility requirements in the composition of two relations. Let R be a relation from X to Y , X being the cartesian product A × B whose elements are the couples (a, b). Q be a relation from X to Y , X being the cartesian product A×B ×C whose elements are the ordered sequence (a, b, c). In order to join the two relations R and Q we introduce the projection relation P from X to X defined by
and we left multiply R by P to obtain P R. The resulting relation represents the same requirements as R, but is signature-compatible with Q, hence we can derive the expression P R Q.
System Architecture and System Requirements
The system we developed the specification for is the system that provides Fault Tolerance Capability (FTC) with respect to faults on sensors and actuators of the DHC-2 Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS). The requirements for such system result from the AFCS fault tolerance requirements and from the FTC design constraints. In this section we briefly illustrate the composition of the FTC environment, and we introduce fault tolerance requirements and design constraints. Figure 1 shows a simplified architecture of an Analytical Redundancy based Fault Tolerant Flight Control System. The Measurement Subsystem consists of the Sensors and related electronics. It measures quantities that allow observation of the state of the aircraft. The Actuator Subsystem (AS) consists of the Power Control Units (PCU's) that operate the aircraft control surfaces. This subsystem along with the aircraft control surfaces and engines produce aerodynamic and thrust forces and moments that control the state of the aircraft. The Interface Subsystem (IS) contains all displays and control devices through which the pilot maneuvers the aircraft. The Processing subsystem (PS) includes the on-board computer and the software components of the FCS. This software implements the Flight Control Laws (FCL), the algorithms that specify how current measurements, pilot inputs, and actuator positions are to be processed to produce the commands to the actuators at the next time step. The FTC-AR block stands for the software routines that process software variables representing sensor inputs and actuator outputs to make provision for fault tolerance.
FTFCS and DHC-2 aircraft

AFCS Fault Tolerance Requirements
As for the AFCS fault tolerance requirements we resorted to the military specification MIL-9490D "Flight Control Systems -Design, Installation and Test of Piloted Aircraft, General Specification for" [1] . This is the active specification for FCS's of US Air Force aircraft. Our focus is on autopilot control functions. We decompose the requirements into functional requirements and operational requirements. The functional requirements collect the performance requirements of the AFCS control functions and the warning and status display requirements. The performance requirements specify steady-state and transient constraints after engagement of the autopilot functions. The warning requirements are related to the capability of the FTC system to assess the operating condition of the FT-FCS and to produce a warning if any of its components is faulty. We refer to the fault tolerance requirements as operational requirements since they specify the required behaviour of the system as function of its operating condition. The fault tolerance requirements subsume the functional requirements described above. The formulation we adopt for the fault tolerance requirements results from the definition of fail operational capability from [1] :
Fail operational The capability of the FCS for continued operation without degradation following a single failure, and to fail passive in the event of a related subsequent failure. Fail passive The capability of the FCS to automatically disconnect and to revert to a passive state following a failure.
We partition the class of fallible components F into four classes of equivalence: class of measurement units M , class of actuation units A, class of processing units P , and class of interface units I. For the purposes of specifying the fault tolerance requirements, failures of components that belong to the same class are considered related.
Design Constraints
The specification of the FTC system includes two design constraints. The first constraint requires the system to make provision for faults within the Measurement and Actuation subsystems by exploiting analytical redundancy, as opposed to physical redundancy. This constraint is supported by the assumption that a mechanism orthogonal to analytical redundancy is adopted to make provision for faults on components of the Processing and Interface subsystems. Since analytical redundancy maps into the correlation among sensor outputs and actuator inputs, we take into account the redundancy approach by formulating the warning requirements in terms of sensor outputs and actuator inputs as they are available to the FTC-AR unit in Figure 1 . The second constraint requires the FTC system to be modular with respect to Measurement and Actuation subsystems. That is, two different modules must provide fault tolerance each with respect to faults within one of the two subsystems. This constraint reflects into a splitting of the performance requirements into two separate performance requirements for the Measurement and Actuation subsystems.
We adopt a closed-system specification approach where the entire environment is described within the specification; as opposed to the open-system approach where only the interface between the system and the environment is described. Furthermore, we adopt a history-based specification paradigm. All functional requirements and descriptions of environment components are specified by the set of acceptable histories of the relevant quantities. We use relations to specify the functional requirements and to describe the environment components. In this section we illustrate some aspects of the specification and provide a sample relation.
Data Types
Within the entire specification each signature variable yields the same value (referential transparency). This property makes the specification easier to read and eliminates redundant definition of variables. In fact, all variables are defined only once, as opposed to defining them for each use in a different relation. The scope of signature variables is local to the relation the signature belongs to and matching among variables is obtained through the composition of the relations.
Typically, variables used in relations represent instantaneous values of the quantities used to specify the requirement. This approach allows for specifying requirements in terms of instantaneous input/output relationships. On the other hand, some FCS requirements are formulated as a constraint upon a quantity's time evolution over a time interval. A simple example is given by the RMS-error requirement for the hold-type control functions. The RMSerror is the square root of the integral of the square deviation between the actual value of the relevant quantity and the value-to-hold within a specified time interval.
To specify such requirements we adopt time-history variables representing the whole time evolution of the related quantity. For example, we use the variable φ() to represent the time evolution of the aircraft bank angle. The empty brackets () indicate that the variable represents the whole time evolution of a quantity rather than the value of the quantity at a specific time instant. When we refer to the instantaneous value of the quantity we specify the time instant within the brackets.
Use of time-history variables is consistent with the role of the specification within the certification environment. Because of the integral nature of some requirements certification must be carried out off-line. For each test case flight data are collected from the flight simulation and the entire time-history of each flight quantity is assigned to the corresponding variable. Hence, the variables are processed according to the specification to verify whether the requirements have been met.
Relations
We adopt relations to describe each component of the FTFCS and of the DHC-2 aircraft, as well as the FTC functional requirements. Each component is referred to by the identifier C c ; the subscript c uniquely identifies the component. B c,n denotes the relation describing the n-th behaviour of component C c . For n = 0, B c,n describes the component's nominal behaviour, while for 0 < n ≤ f c it describes one of the component's fault modes; f c being the number of fault modes.
The relations describing the system components contain technical details that are beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the interested reader to [3] . For illustrative purposes we present the relation that specifies the Heading Hold (HH) control function requirement. This requirement is fairly simple, yet provides a number of meaningful points for discussion. The original formulation of the requirement from [1] is reported below:
Heading
Hold "In smooth air, heading shall be maintained within a static accuracy of ±0.5 degree with respect to the reference. In turbulence, RMS deviations shall not exceed 5 degrees in heading at the intensities specified in 3.1.3.7. When heading hold is engaged, the aircraft shall roll towards wings level. The reference heading shall be that heading that exists when the aircraft passes through a roll attitude that is wings level plus or minus a tolerance."
The HH requirement specifies accuracy requirements for the heading angle for operation in both smooth air and turbulence when the HH function is engaged. By analyzing the requirement we identify the quantities that are used within the specification; hence, we assign an identifier to each quantity. Tables 1 trough 4 list all identifiers used within the HH relational specification, and separate them into constants, domain, image, and quantified variables, and auxiliary functions.
The signature and the predicate of the HH relational specification are given by the following two equations:
ID and value Type Definition
ψ acc = 0.5 · degree2SI angle-T heading accuracy in smooth air ψ RM S = 5 · degree2SI angle-T RMS heading accuracy in turbulence φ acc = 1.0 · degree2SI angle-T roll accuracy in smooth air 
Hence, the relational specification for the HH control function requirement is:
In this paper we focus on the specification of the requirements within the framework of relational algebra, rather than on developing a set of complete and feasible requirements. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that we found a number of flaws within the original formulation of the requirements. Whenever possible we modified the requirements to correct them. An example from the HH control function requirement is in the paragraph: "When heading hold is engaged the aircraft shall roll towards wings level". This paragraph has been formalized by requiring the airplane to reach -at a certain time instant t 2 -a state with a bank angle close to zero. To quantify how close, we adopted the accuracy threshold φ acc used in the Roll Attitude Hold specification (Section 3.1.2.1 of [1] ). This solution is our best guess to make up for the lack of a threshold in the original requirement. Another problem that we found in the requirements of the autopilot functions is the lack of any indication of the transient time between autopilot engagement and the instant when the steady-state condition is reached. In the case of the Heading Hold requirement the transient interval is [t 1 , t 2 ]. The requirement applies only if this interval is larger than the interval ∆t that it will take the aircraft to reach wing level attitude. ∆t is function of the roll angle φ(t 1 ), the roll rateφ(t 1 ), and the roll rate capability of the aircraft in the current point of the flight envelope. Determination of ∆t was out of the scope of our study, so we limited ourselves to specify the original requirement and report the problem.
Fault Hypotheses
Operational requirements are specified as function of the operating condition of the system. The operating condition of the system results from the operating conditions of its components. We adopt an ordered sequence of the relations B c,n to represent the system operational status. For example, the fault free operating condition is represented by the following sequence of relations:
where c1, c2, c3 identify some of the system components. Such sequence is an element of the space Σ:
where (X c , Y c ) denotes the signature of the relations B c,n . Under the system operating condition h ∈ Σ the operational behaviour of component C c is represented by a relation O c (h) that refines the corresponding relation in the sequence. For example, the sequence in Equation 8 implies that component C c1 is operating as described by the relation O c1 (h 0,0 ) B c1,0 . We group the system operational conditions into three classes, on the basis of the different action required to the FTC system in the fault tolerance requirements. Each class captures a fault hypothesis upon the system. We denote the three hypotheses as the fault-free hypothesis H 0 , the single-fault hypothesis H 1 , and the multiple-fault hypothesis H 2 . Furthermore, two classes of operating conditions describe the assumptions that result from adopting a mechanism independent from analytical redundancy to make provision for faults within the Processing and Interface subsystems. These are the class H P of system operating conditions with the components of the Processing subsystem working according to their nominal behaviour, and the the class H I of system operating conditions with the components of the Interface subsystem working according to their nominal behaviour. Another class H captures the assumption that the manufacturer specification of nominal and faulty behaviours of each component form the basis of the fault tolerance requirements. The definition of all classes of system operating conditions follows. Each fault hypothesis is total with respect to the class of fallible components. Set U in the definitions is the set of components used by any of the autopilot control functions.
Fault hypothesis assumption
The following assumption underlies each fault hypothesis: all fallible components operate either according to their nominal behaviour or according to one of their fault modes.
Fault-free hypothesis
All of the components used by the FT-FCS are working according to their nominal behaviour.
Single-fault hypothesis At least one component among those used by the FT-FCS is working according to one of its fault modes, and there are no related faults.
Multiple-fault hypothesis
At least two related components among those used by the FT-FCS are working according to one of the corresponding fault modes.
Fault-free hypothesis upon P subsystem All of the processing components used by the FT-FCS are working according to their nominal behaviour.
Fault-free hypothesis upon I subsystem All of the interface components used by the FT-FCS are working according to their nominal behaviour.
Composing the Specification
Once all the individual relations are formulated we can compose them to form the building blocks of the operational requirements. To carry out the composition we use the join operator for simultaneous requirements and the product operator for sequential requirements. In order to satisfy the signature compatibility requirements of these operators we apply -where needed -projection and expansion relations. For the sake of readability we omit representing these space-altering relations. For compositions that do not follow in either of the two categories we resort to the direct composition of the relations by accessing the single elements of their signatures. In the following subsections we illustrate the composition of parts of the system, the composition of the functional requirements, and the specification of the fault tolerance requirements.
Composition of Systems Parts
The structure of the relational specification of the DHC-2 aircraft equipped with the FTFCS resembles the architecture of the real system. A separate relation specifies the behaviour of each element of the architecture. The highest level of the composition consists of the composition of the DHC-2 aircraft specification and of the FTFCS specification. The relational formulation of such composition is illustrated below, while Figure 2 depicts a graphical representation of the composition. The figure highlights the signature of the operand relations as well as the signature of their composition. The parameter h ∈ Σ represents the system operating condition.
The second level of the composition consists of the composition of the two separate specifications related to the DCH-2 aircraft and to the FTFCS respectively. For illustrative purposes we report below the relational specification of the DHC-2 aircraft; it clearly maps the structure of the aircraft dynamics in Figure 3 .
Composition of Functional Requirements
Performance and warning requirements are the functional requirements of the FTC system. Performance requirements for each control function are captured by a different relation: the relation R P AH specifies the requirements for the Pitch Attitude Hold control function, the relation R ALH specifies the requirements for the Altitude Hold control function, etc. A set S ao specifies the constraints upon the operation of the control functions as set of admissible histories of control inputs. The whole set of performance requirements is specified through the relation R P . This relation is obtained by joining the single relations as described by the following equation:
For the details of the above requirement we refer the reader to [3] .
By using the system description 16 and the requirement 20 the correctness of the FTFCS design under nominal (fault-free) operating conditions is specified as follows:
In virtue of the monotonicity of the composition with respect to the refinement ordering, Equation 21 allows us to specify the requirements of each part of the system from the nominal behaviour of the system components. Hence, the required behaviour of the sensor as it manifests at software level is specified by the following relation:
The relations describing the two sets of sensors B Sp,0 and B Ss,0 are composed with the relation describing the Analog-to-Digital-Converter (ADC) B ADC,0 and the relation describing the input driver B in,0 . The resulting relation R XX describes the relationship among the aircraft state X and its software counterpartX as it results from the processing of sensors, ADC, and software driver. This is the behaviour that must be preserved by the FTC system that monitors the Measurement subsystem. Analog considerations apply for the the FTC system that monitors the Actuation subsystem.
The warning and status display requirements is supported by a relation RID AR (h) that captures the analytical redundancy within the system. The quantities carrying redundant information and providing redundant action upon the system state are the software variables representing sensor outputŝ X and actuator inputsÛ c . These are the quantities processed by the FTC-AR to identify the system operating condition and to provide required fault tolerance. RID AR (h) describes the correlation among the variablesÛ c andX and results from the composition of the behaviours of all components in the path fromÛ c toX. The composition mechanism is similar to that used in Equations 16 and 22.
The warning requirement is described by the following relation:
This relation is composed of three parts, each part specifies the requirements related to a different fault hypothesis. The output variablesŴ andŶ d represent the software variables corresponding to fault warnings and automatic disengagement warning respectively.
Composition of Fail Operational Requirements
The operational requirements bring together performance requirements, warning requirements, system decomposition, and fault hypotheses to specify the required behaviour of the system under different operating conditions. The fail operational requirement for the FTC system that monitors the Measurement subsystem is:
The first part of the specification describes the relevant operating conditions for the requirements, that is fault-free and single-fault conditions, under the assumption of Processing and Interface components working according to their nominal behaviour. The left-side of the refinement ordering describes the subsystem that is required to provide a fail operational measurement of the aircraft state. The composition with the F T C M is left unspecified for the sake of space. The right-side of the refinement ordering represents the subsystem requirements. A natural language formulation of the requirement reads:
The F T C M shall process software variables representing outputs from the Measurement subsystem and inputs to the Actuator subsystem to produce a set of validated software measurement variables that allow meeting the requirements for the observation subsystem R XX . The above function shall be performed under all fault-free and single-fault operating conditions of the DHC-2 equipped with the FT-FCS, and under the assumption of correct operation of Processing and Interface components.
The warning and status display requirements for the F T C M system are specified as below:
The structure of this specification is similar to the structure of the previous specification. σ M is a projection relation that alters the signature of the relation R W AR to include only the outputs relevant to the Measurement subsystem.
Fault Tolerance Features
In this section we briefly discuss some interesting corollaries of the fault tolerance requirements and of their modeling. We denote by M c the class of relations that refine any of the manufacturer specified off-nominal behavior B c,n , with 0 < n ≤ f c . S c represents the class of relations describing faulty components that affect the overall system behavior (i.e. cause a fault at the system level, for this particular system). All of the relations that are in F c but not in S c describe cases of "maskable" faults, i.e. component faults that do not affect the system behavior.
A Hierarchy of Faults
Sets D c , I c , and A c represent the sets of (faulty) behaviors that can, respectively, be detected, identified, and accommodated by means of the analytical redundancy approach. The intersection of these three sets is the set of faulty behaviors for which we can provide comprehensive fault tolerance. The intersection of this set with set M c is the set of faults that are specified by the manufacturer and for which we can make fault tolerance provisions. The fact that this intersection might be strictly contained into M c means that we might not be able to make provision for all the manufacturer-specified faults adopting analytical redundancy.
Feasibility Conditions for Fault Tolerance
Analysis of the warning requirements in Equation 23 reveals that two feasibility conditions must be satisfied in order to have only one admissible output from the FTC system. The first condition is a detectability condition:
This condition is self-explanatory: if a pair of operating condition existed that make these two relations not disjoint, there would be input-output pairs that belong to both, denying us the ability to tell, in the presence of such pairs, whether there is a fault or not. Analogously, we can formulate the detectability condition for the remaining pairs of fault hypotheses:
The second condition is the identifiability condition:
This condition guarantees that there exists a one-to-one mapping from the set of single-fault operating conditions to the couples (Û c ,X). This is the mapping that the FTC is required to capture to identify the faulty components.
The recoverability condition results from the condition of existence of a solution F T C M for the implicit Equation 24.
Conclusion: Summary and Assessment
In this paper we briefly discuss our experience with specifying the requirements of a fault tolerant flight control system using relations. This sample application involves not only functional requirements, but also performance requirements and operational requirements dealing with fault tolerance. We have pondered, at the start of the project, the possibility of using a computer supported specification language, but have renounced the idea in favor of relational specifications, for the following reasons.
• Traditional specification languages are typically built around a predefined specification paradigm (state machine paradigm, axiomatic system paradigm, algebraic paradigm, etc) and we were afraid that no single paradigm would allow us sufficient latitude for the purposes of this example.
• Traditional specification languages typically have a predefined vocabulary of composition operators. Trading structure for versatility, we preferred to adopt a notation that allows us adequate latitude in composing subspecifications.
• Traditional specification languages typically have a predefined specification format (e.g. specifying input/ output relations). The specification of our sample example is not a plain functional specification in the traditional sense, but involves the specification of fault tolerance properties which do not fit the traditional (input/ output) mold.
Some of the issues/ dilemmas that we pondered as we were trying to derive this specification are discussed below.
• Determinacy vs. Generality. In the face of the complexity of the specification task, we pondered the tradeoffs between writing deterministic specifications (easier to compose) and writing non-deterministic specifications (more general, can be arbitrarily vague). Because we use relational specifications, it is more natural to write non-deterministic specifications, especially that these allow us to produce a problem-oriented specification rather a solutionoriented specification. Also, by adopting monotonic composition operators exclusively, we preserve many of the algebraic properties of deterministic composition.
• Boolean vs. Numeric Results. The specification task that we carried out was part of a larger project, which also includes a verification/ testing task, in which our specification is used as an oracle. In the testing task, our specification is used to test the consistency of the data resulting from flight experiments against the specifications that we have written. We have pondered two options: The first option consists in producing boolean results, whereby the specification considers an input/ output pair and determines whether the requirements are met; the second option consists in producing numeric results, whereby the specification considers an input/ output pair and produces a numeric measure of the degree to which the data satisfies the requirements. The tradeoffs of this decision are summarized as follows:
The Boolean solution offers uniform treatment across relations (spares us the need to decide the precision range for each relation), and the numeric solution allows statistical quantifications, and offers continuity in assessing correctness (no arbitrary cutoff point).
• Specification Task vs. Verification Task. Related to the issue above is the issue of whether the question of correctness should be decided at specification time or at verification time; this question is all the more pressing that the specification and the verification tasks were carried out by two separate teams. It seems logical to consider that correctness should be decided by the specification task; but many details pertaining to the final decision of correctness were not only unknown to the specification team, they were not known to the verification team at specification time. For example, the decision of what numeric precision to require (or, conversely, what numeric deviation to tolerate) depends on many details which are not known until the verification framework is completely set up, and all the sources of roundoff error are analyzed; in light of this, it appears preferable to delegate the decision of accuracy standards to the verification task. The tradeoffs of this decision are summarized as follows: the first option (deciding at specifi-cation time) avoids arbitrary determinacy, and the second option (deciding at verification time) separates functionality from range specification, and allows on the fly adjustment of precision standards.
